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In the context of neo-liberal proliferation and increasingly anti-indigenous 
Mexican legislation, a destitute community of peasants took up arms in the southeastern 
state of Chiapas.  Enflamed by 500 years of abuse and catalyzed by the destruction of the 
Mexican ejido system, they revolted. 
“Basta,” they cried in ferocious unison on January 1, 1994, as the Ejército 
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), or Zapatista Army of National Liberation, rose 
up in Chiapas, Mexico.  But what exactly did they mean?  Besides the direct Spanish 
translation, “Enough,” what were these strange new revolutionaries demanding?  At first 
glance they seemed to resemble other Latin American guerilla movements in the 20th 
century, but the keen-eyed noticed that perhaps the Zapatistas were something different.  
As the first days of the insurrection passed, observers began to scramble to define these 
Chiapan revolutionaries.  Many, cognoscente of the tradition of Marxist influence within 
Latin American radical movements, found the ‘socialist’ name tag convenient.  Others, 
most notably northern intellectuals eager to co-opt the rebellion into their own intellectual 
brainchild, labeled the Zapatistas ‘postmodern.’  Still others insisted that this was a 
movement for indigenous rights and land reform.  Indeed, the interpretations were many, 
and they only grew with the intensity and duration of the insurrection.  It turns out, the 
Zapatistas have proved quite difficult to label.  In fact, they have denied outside 
intellectuals the pleasure of placing them into an epistemological box.  The Zapatistas, 
despite the best effort of the academic community, refuse to be categorized.   
Perhaps the intrigue of the Zapatistas is that they propose the most passionate and 
romantic ideals, and yet they are full of apparent contradiction.  They claim to be a 
revolutionary army with no aspiration of attaining power.  Behind facemasks and rifles, 
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they promoted the ideals of non-violence.  The Zapatistas demand indigenous rights and 
local autonomy from the platform of global change.1
In the effort to sift through these complexities, academics have utilized five 
general categories in their attempt to classify and conceptualize the EZLN.  These major 
competing paradigms are: radical democracy, indigenous rights, socialist, anti-
globalization, and postmodern.  The intellectual quest to categorize has proposed each of 
these paradigms, as well as many hybrids, creating a sea of diverse intellectual 
understanding (and misunderstanding).  This analysis, however, will focus on the five 
paradigms listed above. 
  They seem to promote diverging 
and even mutually exclusive, socio-political theories.  To the outside observer, the EZLN 
epitomizes contradiction, yet under more extensive analysis they reveal unprecedented 
consistency in their democratic and social ideals.   
First, many scholars have taken note of the Zapatistas’ unique political structure 
and utilized it to categorize this complex revolt as a struggle for radical democracy.  As 
Gustavo Esteva argues, the EZLN has constructed an innovative and truly revolutionary 
democratic society.  John Ross, however, one of the leading experts on the Zapatista 
rebellion, disagrees.  Although he recognizes their radically democratic nature, he 
classifies the movement as a struggle for indigenous rights, in the tradition of centuries of 
Indian resistance, rather than a movement to construct a radically new political model.   
The third paradigm, the socialist analysis, seems to fit nicely into the 
revolutionary history of Latin America.  Marxist rebellion has dominated twentieth 
century Latin American political revolutions.  Why, then, should the Zapatistas be any 
different?  They clearly demand economic restructuring, capitalist resistance, and a more 
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equal distribution of wealth.  Daniel Nugent, a prominent socialist scholar, claims that the 
Zapatistas are essentially Marxists.  Other scholars from the radical, anti-capitalist 
community have, nevertheless, diverged from the socialist label.   They classify the 
insurrection as a rejection of neoliberal trade policies imposed by the wealthy nations of 
the world and exemplified by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  In 
fact, this interpretation has become so popular within the leftist community that the 
Zapatistas have become a symbol of global resistance to free trade capitalism.   
The final, and perhaps most popular interpretation among northern intellectuals, is 
the postmodern view.  These scholars justify their claim by pointing out the unique nature 
of the Zapatista movement and its divergence from other movements in the ‘modern’ 
past.  This approach, as we will see, is both unconvincing and dangerous.  It conceals the 
suffering of the indigenous populations of Mexico while undermining this rebellion’s 
connection to the past.   
Although each of these interpretations provide some insight into the complex 
Zapatista movement, each of them falls short of providing a comprehensive 
understanding.  Intellectuals, in their attempts to make sense of complexity, often 
rationalize the world into conceptual categories, sub-categories, and well-defined boxes.  
These categories are often truly helpful and legitimate in quest to understand the world, 
but they can conceal important complexities.  In addition, these preconceived categories 
can prejudice the mind and inhibit the ability to recognize something truly unique and 
innovative.  Scholars make the mistake of prematurely placing a movement into an 
inappropriate category.  Like a child in a play room, they attempt to fit a square block 
into a round hole when it simply does not fit.  Perhaps, instead of cramming the EZLN 
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into a preconceived slot, they should try to understand it as a movement of its own.  
Perhaps a new category must be constructed, although it is not the purpose of this 
analysis to do so.  Rather, I contend that none of the above paradigms provide an 
adequate understanding of the Zapatista uprising.  The EZLN must be understood in its 
own right, within the context of past revolutions but not bound to them.  Furthermore, we 
must recognize it for its innovations but not label it with the inaccurate, and less than 
illuminating, ‘postmodern’ paradigm.   
 
A Brief History of the EZLN 
 
Chiapas, the wealthiest state in Mexico in natural resources but with the poorest 
indigenous population, became a hotbed of peasant organizing throughout the second half 
of the twentieth century.  A large native population continually exploited by local land-
owners and national and international businesses for cheap, expendable labor created an 
environment in which peasant organizing thrived.  Groups utilizing every strategy from 
reformist organizing to Maoist revolution developed in resistance to exploitation.  With 
few successes, and an increasingly destitute Indian population, these groups began to 
loose their popular support.  Chiapas was desperate for social change; it ranked first 
among Mexican states in illiteracy rate, rate of population older than 15 who have not 
finished primary school, percent of people living without electricity and in overcrowded 
housing, and in lowest wages, with more than 80 percent making less than twice 
minimum wage.2  As health problems often accompany economic hardship, Chiapas 
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suffered 150,000 indigenous deaths as a result of “poverty, malnutrition and curable 
diseases during the decade before the Zapatista Uprising.”3
In 1982, Mexican oil prices plummeted, limiting Mexico’s ability to repay 
national debts and causing a massive instability in global banking.
 
4  Consequently, the 
international financial community forced Mexico to radically restructure its finances, 
slashing funding to rural assistance programs.  Furthermore, Mexican president Salinas 
de Gortari insisted on reforming Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, stripping the 
communal ownership of indigenous land that had been established after the 1910 
revolution.5  As Subcomandante Marcos would later comment, “That was an important 
catalyst. The reforms negated the legal possibility to obtain land, and it was land that was 
the basis of peasants’ self-defense.”6
The revolt of the EZLN, however, was far from a spontaneous event.  More than a 
decade of planning preceded the insurection.  On November 16, 1983, a group of six 
Mexican idealists from the north (one of whom being Marcos) met a small group of 
Indians and radical activists in Chiapas to discuss political and military options for 
improving their desperate situation.
  
7  The group, which would become the EZLN, 
quickly went underground and began to train in the Lacandón Jungle.8  They slowly 
acquired weapons, grew in number, and educated themselves on revolutionary tactics and 
the laws of warfare.  Early in its organizational history, the EZLN was a socialist 
organization in ideology and strategy, like many revolutionary groups which had come 
before it.9  This, however, changed as the outside organizers and local indigenous groups 
began to melt into one another.  The leaders began to stray form their Marxist 
fundamentals while the local population began to recognize larger socio-political issues 
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and understand their conditions within this expanded scope.10
As their organization solidified, conditions within Chiapas only worsened.  Not 
only were Mexico’s national policies limiting the ability of indigenous people to defend 
themselves by removing local control of government and more particularly land, 
international policies were doing the same.  On December 8, 1993, United States 
President Bill Clinton signed NAFTA.  Critics shunned the agreement, arguing that it 
would encourage United States business to relocate to Mexico in order exploit cheap, 
non-union labor and weak environmental regulations.
  It was at this point, when 
outside leaders and local people combined their experiences and attitudes, that the 
Zapatistas began to multiply rapidly.   
11  Mexican farmers especially 
feared the impacts of NAFTA, as it would flood the Mexican market with cheap United 
States crops, especially corn.12
Not only was the situation for indigenous people in Chiapas going from bad to 
worse, but faith in the established peasant organizations and their insistence to work 
within the system was dwindling.  To the Zapatistas, it seemed clear that the only way to 
create the change they desired was through rebellion.  As numbers continued to grow and 
local peasant organizations joined the ranks of the EZLN, it seems clear that the Mexican 
government began to take notice.  Government and military officials became aware of the 
Zapatista rebels as early as December of 1992, when authorities noticed the unloading of 
arms “somewhere in the Lacandón Jungle.”
  As neoliberal economic policies typically harm poorest 
regions most, Chiapas would feel the negative impact of trade liberalization to the fullest. 
13  Shortly afterward, they were able to 
infiltrate a spy into the Zapatista ranks.  By May of 1993, the Mexican Army had moved 
4,000 troops to the region surrounding the Lacandón Jungle, and conflict seemed to be on 
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the horizon.  Skirmishes, with only few casualties, did arise, but the large-scale war 
expected by General Godínez, of the Mexican military, failed to materialize at that 
point.14
The Zapatistas had escalated to red alert in expectance of an invasion, but on May 
26th the military was suddenly, and surprisingly, withdrawn from the region.
 
15  The 
EZLN was perplexed.  It now seems quite clear that Mexican officials withdrew their 
troops out of fear that war in Chiapas would cause uncertainty within the international 
business community which could postpone or even prevent the passage of NAFTA.  
Proceso, a popular Mexican magazine, reported on January 10, 1994, “To have entered 
the jungle in full force would have had international repercussions.  Salinas and his 
advisers decided to postpone the confrontations until after NAFTA was functioning and 
the August elections had taken place.”16
That day, the Zapatistas sacked the political and economic center of the Chiapan 
highlands, San Cristóbal de las Casas, as well as three municipal seats in Ocosingo, Las 
Margaritas, and Altamirano.
  This delay by the Mexican government allowed 
the EZLN’s rebellion to be staged upon the terms of the indigenous people, not the 
government.  On January 1, 1994, the day that NAFTA went into effect, Chiapas 
exploded into a surprise rebellion. 
17  According to their 1993 letter to the People of Mexico, 
their demands were simply “work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, 
freedom, democracy, and peace.”18  The Mexican military responded quickly and 
forcefully, driving the Zapatistas into the jungle where they would continue to run an 
information campaign, building international support and mounting pressure on the 
government to meet their demands.   
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A series of negotiations took place between the EZLN and government officials.  
In 1995, in negotiations know as the San Andres accords, the government conceded to 
substantial “indigenous autonomy and self determination.”  Their promises, however, 
were empty, for they never materialized.19  A 1996 congressional bill gave hope to the 
EZLN that the conflict might be resolved.  The bill would allow indigenous self-
governance, collective land ownership and control of their natural recourses.20
In late February 2001, the EZLN sent a historic delegation to Mexico City to 
address congress.  In their address, Commander Esther, a Zapatista woman, declared, 
“Our warriors have done their job.  The person speaking to you is not the military leader 
of a rebel army, but the political leadership of a legitimate movement.”
  Ernesto 
Zedillo, Mexico’s new president, shelved the bill and consequently heightened the 
tension in Chiapas.  Hopes were raised once again when, in 2000, newly elected president 
Vicente Fox, who had campaigned on the slogan that he would solve the problems in 
Chiapas “in fifteen minutes,” presented a bill to congress that he thought would meet the 
demands of the EZLN.   
21  Congress, 
however, was not impressed, for they stripped the bill of most of its progressive 
language, an act that greatly disappointed and outraged the indigenous community.  The 
EZLN considered the revised bill a “call to war.”22
 
  They returned to the Lacandón 
Jungle where they continue to struggle for the improvement of the Indigenous situation.  
One major task that has occupied much of their energy, and which continues to do so, is 
the continuous attempt to construct their image and communicate their agenda to a 
curious and confused global community.   
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The Zapatistas as Proponents of Radical Democracy 
 
One of the more popular paradigms utilized by the global community claims that 
the Zapatistas are constructing a new model for political society.  The EZLN struggles for 
the radical democratization of their socio-political experience.  Perhaps beyond any other 
goal, they attempt to create a truly democratic society.  Here, it is import to distinguish 
between the Zapatistas’ notion of democracy and the western tradition of representative 
democracy.  The Zapatistas see the modern ‘democratic’ state as the failure of the 
western democratic tradition.  It caters to the powerful elite and neglects the masses at the 
bottom of the social hierarchy.  This democratic structure has failed the vast majority of 
the human population.   
The EZLN proposes a new form of democratic structure based on the cultivation 
of ‘people’s power’ and the embrace of ‘personal and collective difference.’23
As Indian peoples that we mostly are, we claim to govern ourselves, with 
autonomy, because we don’t want any longer to be subjects of the will of any 
national or foreign power…Justice should be administered by our own 
communities, according to their customs and traditions, without the intervention 
of corrupt and illegitimate governments.
   
24
 
 
‘Commanding obeying,’ combined with a faith in ‘civil society,’ provides the 
foundation of the Zapatistas’ democratic model.  ‘Command obeying’, an apparent 
oxymoron, is a political practice barrowed from indigenous tradition in which leaders are 
constantly held accountable to those whom they represent through an ever-present threat 
of public removal.25  Continually, in a variety of communications, they promote, “…the 
right to democracy, so that everyone’s opinions should have value, so that the popular 
will be respected and enforced, by electing or revoking, as needed, a form of government 
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and governmental public servants.  We demand that those who govern command 
obeying.”26
Civil society is the people themselves, self-empowered and unattached to any 
political party or theoretical meta-narrative and in opposition to state power.  The 
Zapatistas, as an exercise in civil society, have created a democratic model with a radical 
decentralization of power.  Through command obeying and a less-hierarchical society, 
which has organized more than a thousand communities into thirty two regional 
municipalities, each locally controlled, they have largely accomplished their democratic 
goals.
  Therefore, at any time a leader can be revoked by the community if his or 
her actions are unacceptable.  The Zapatista proposal for radical democracy derives its 
power directly from what they continually refer to as civil society.   
27
The very concept of radical democracy is based upon the premise that diverse 
personal and collective opinions must be respected and represented.  ‘Basta,’ the rallying 
cry of the insurrection displays the ability of the EZLN to embody a multiplicity of social 
discontent.  By saying ‘enough,’ they are rejecting exploitation in all of its forms, not just 
the abuse of workers or landless peasants or indigenous people or any other collective 
subdivision of the Zapatistas.  Rather, the Zapatista political model is completely 
inclusive.  Within this system they have been able to resist power without the goal or 
taking power.  In effect, radical democracy provides legitimacy to the insurrection and its 
larger social goals.   
  Perhaps this is best represented by the wide acceptance of divergent perspectives 
and thought within the Zapatistas’ democratic system.   
Understanding the radical democracy paradigm entails separating it from the 
concept of radical democracy itself.  Therefore, those who subscribe to this paradigm 
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contend that the Zapatista rebellion is essentially a rebellion to create radical democracy.  
This is true.  However, this paradigm falls short of providing a comprehensive 
description of the EZLN.  The movement must be understood for its demand of radical 
democracy along with many other issues.  It is also a struggle for economic equity, anti-
neoliberalism, and racial equality.  It is important to remember here that this critique is 
not aimed at the ability of radical democracy itself to address these varying issues.  
Rather, it is proclaiming that scholars who have attempted to encapsulate the EZLN 
within the category of “radical democrats’ have oversimplified the movement.  Unless 
economic, ethnic and traditional factors are address within a paradigm, it is doomed to 
fail, destroyed by the attempt to oversimplify. 
 
The Zapatistas as Indigenous Rebels 
 
The indigenous rebel paradigm has found many supporters as academics have 
struggled to understand the Zapatistas.  Despite its shortcomings, this approach helps to 
illuminate a great deal of the EZLN’s nature.  It claims that the Zapatistas represent an 
Indian rebellion, sharing a legacy of many former indigenous revolutionaries and their 
goal of reconstructing a traditional Indian society.   
Part of this assertion is very valid.  The EZLN’s revolutionary rhetoric clearly 
attempts to connect the current insurrection with historic struggle.  The very word choice 
for their name, the Zapatistas, is burrowed from the name of the famous revolutionary 
Emiliano Zapata, who fought for land reform and indigenous rights in the 1910 Mexican 
Revolution.  Attempting to show their connection to age old oppression, the Zapatistas 
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have adopted the rallying cry, “Zapata vive, la lucha sigue” (“Zapata lives, the struggle 
continues”).  This is a powerful organizing slogan that solidifies peasant discontent, while 
generating legitimacy through connection to the historic hero.  The Zapatistas are not the 
first Latin American radical movement to implement this strategy.  The Sandinistas of 
Nicaragua borrowed the name of a historic national hero, Sandino, for their name.   
In this same vain, the Zapatistas opted to name their massive meeting hall, 
constructed to hold civil society gatherings, after the famous site of the 1914 Sovereign 
Revolutionary Convention.  The latter was where revolutionary leaders met for the first 
time to discuss the creation of a free Mexican state.  The Zapatistas meeting hall, like the 
city that hosted this historic convention, is called Aguascalientes, a name that resonates in 
Mexican historical memory.28
Image construction is important to any social movement, and the EZLN has 
attempted to create their image with a strong connection to Mexico’s historical memory 
and nationalist sentiment.  This is a strategic construction.  As John Ross puts it, “History 
is a formidable weapon.”
   
29  In fact, historical legitimacy has replaced the need for great 
military might.  The EZLN, with its insignificant weaponry and human numbers, could 
be easily decimated by the power of the Mexican military.  They have created widespread 
empathy by using history to construct an ideological high ground to compensate for their 
lack of military strength.30  Gramsci has described this process as a “war of position.”31  
As a result, the Mexican forces, under the watchful eye of the Mexican people and the 
people of the world, opted against waging full-scale warfare to put down the EZLN’s 
rebellion.  
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Not only does understanding the Zapatistas as an indigenous rebellion help the 
EZLN strategically, it also helps the outside observer to place many of the Zapatistas’ 
demands into a historical context.  Most notably in this respect, they are revolting against 
the Salinas administration’s revocation of land reform.  Land reform had been established 
following the 1910 revolution in an effort to resurrect traditional communal land 
ownership.  In this sense the rebellion of the EZLN is a reaction to Salinas’s anti-
indigenous legislation that destroyed native economic and social structure as well as the 
historically symbolic achievements of the indigenous hero Emiliano Zapata, who rebelled 
in response to similar nineteenth century land grabs. 
The elements of traditional indigenous rebellion are important in understanding 
the Zapatista insurrection and its social goals.  Nevertheless, the Zapatistas are far from a 
traditional revolutionary force.  They are not seeking a return to the past.  Clearly, they 
are proposing new and innovative socio-economic models, spawned from the past but 
certainly not attempting to return to it.  Their revolutionary tactics, including the divorce 
of revolutionary protocol from the control of the state, as well as their demands for 
radical democracy, are far from traditional.  In an apparent paradox, the Zapatistas are 
visionaries of a truly revolutionary future while simultaneously embracing traditional 
ideals.  These ideals, however, are a hybrid of the traditional and the contemporary.  The 
‘indigenous struggle’ paradigm fails to see the Zapatistas as the innovators that they are.  
Instead, like other attempts to classify this unique movement, it fails in its 
oversimplification.   
 
 
The Socialist Analysis 
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The socialist approach, which was perhaps the first adopted by many analysts, 
focuses largely on the economic factors of Chiapas and, of course, the class struggle.  In 
Chiapas, local hardship certainly provided a fertile environment for Marxist revolt.  As 
the nation’s economy began to shift from a national socialist model to a capitalist, many 
rural populations were largely left out of Mexican growth.32
At the dawn of the EZLN’s organization, the goals were certainly Marxist.  
Leaders saw themselves as members of a ‘revolutionary vanguard’ in the classic 
Communist sense.
  The consequential growth in 
economic disparity between the urban population and the rural peasantry increased class 
tension.  Clearly, class struggle has played an important role in the Zapatista revolt, but is 
it, in fact, a Marxist revolutionary attempt? 
33  They trained in the tactical styles of Che Guevara, the famous Latin 
American Marxist revolutionary, and they studied the theories of Lenin and Mao.34
A United States military analysis published in October of 1994 argues that one of 
the EZLN’s three goals is to “establish socialism,” along with improving living 
conditions and creating avenues by which peasants could enter mainstream Mexican 
society.
  As 
discussed previously, however, this orientation did not last as the Zapatistas grew in 
numbers, diversified, and developed new theoretical constructions, including radical 
democracy.  In the early days of the revolt this transformation was little known, and 
consequently many recognized the demands of the Zapatistas as socialist.  
35  When seen in the light of Zapatista demands for communal land ownership 
and economic autonomy, this assessment makes some sense.  Furthermore, as Dario 
Fernandez-Morera argues in a very negative portrait of the Zapatistas, “among [the goals 
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of the EZLN is] the creation of a socialist country.”36
The Zapatistas were never Marxists, although some of their leaders may have 
been before embarking on their ongoing idealistic evolution; indeed it is a revolutionary 
evolution.  The collaboration between local and outside leaders began to promote the 
traditional indigenous social model that accepts multiplicity and diversity.  Marxism 
became one of many theoretical frameworks embraced by the EZLN.  Leaders discovered 
that radical democracy prevents the dominance of one meta-narrative, like Marxism, 
especially when diverse views are freely expressed.  Soon the Zapatista model radically 
diverged from that of the Leninist Proletariat Dictatorship. 
  These analyses, however, are 
based on inadequate information and preconceived bias.  In fact the Zapatistas have 
proven to be quite anti-socialist despite their goals of socio-economic equality. 
Furthermore, the Zapatistas, unlike Communist revolutionaries, have no party.  
Their political organization is precisely the voice of the communities they represent, and 
their army, too, is composed of the very same elements: civil society.  Through uniquely 
democratic structures, most notably the concept of command-obeying, the Zapatistas 
have redefined the revolutionary project that had previously been dominated by socialists.  
As Luis Lorenzano put it, “the practice of ‘commanding obeying’ clearly demonstrates 
the central difference between the Zapatistas and all former Latin American 
Revolutionary experiences: the Zapatistas are not a ‘guerrilla force’ nor an ‘armed party’ 
with a particular social base, but rather they are the base itself...”37  Unlike the Leninist 
‘party’ approach, the EZLN is a mobilization of a community as a whole.  This justifies 
the common label of the EZLN as a ‘community in arms.’38     
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Perhaps the most compelling refutation of the socialist paradigm rests in the fact 
that the EZLN rejects the goal of attaining state power.  As they wrote, “It is necessary 
that all social relations in Mexico today undergo a profound, radical change.  There must 
be a revolution, a new revolution.  This revolution will only be possible from outside the 
system of the party state.”39  In fact, the Zapatistas, instead of trying to conquer power, 
have simply tried to abolish, or at least redirect, power itself.  “We want to change the 
world,” as Marcos put it, “but not by taking power, not to conquer the world, but to make 
it anew.”40  The divorce of revolutionary tactics from the attainment of state control is 
truly revolutionary and completely contrary to Leninist/Maoist approaches.  Some 
Marxist scholars have debated this point, for good reason.  They cite the fact that the 
Zapatistas’ original declaration of war orders EZLN troops to “Advance to the capital of 
the country, defeat the Mexican Federal Army…and permit the liberated peoples to elect, 
freely and democratically, their own administrative authorities.”41
It is true that we are an armed movement which does not want to take power, as in 
the old revolutionary schemes, and that we call upon civil society to join us in 
peaceful action, to prevent war.  That is the paradox of the EZLN.  But we are 
confronted with a contradiction.  I am referring to the EZLN of eleven years ago, 
which was established to take power through armed force.  We were a military 
organization in the classic sense of the word.  For that reason, the primary 
contribution of what is known today as neo-Zapatismo came from the clash 
between that rigid conception and the reality of the indigenous communities.  The 
insertion of a democratic structure into an authoritarian one; decision-making in 
indigenous communities versus decision-making in a completely vertical political 
military organization.
  Although this is 
certainly true, and gives us insight into the many contradictions within the EZLN, the 
evidence to the contrary abounds.  Marcos affirmed the Zapatista position in late 1994:  
42
 
 
At one point Marcos even went further in his refutation of socialist revolution.  In 
a letter to leaders of the Marxist revolutionary guerrilla forces, called the Peoples 
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Revolutionary Army, he denounced their tactics: “You fight for power, we fight for 
democracy, freedom and justice.  We do not need you help, or want it.”43
 
 
The EZLN as Anti-NeoLiberal Revolutionists 
 
Although they are not socialists, the Zapatistas are certainly anti-capitalists.  As 
previously discussed, the Zapatista rebellion was in many ways a response to the 
economic policies of Salinas.  The nation had made a massive economic transition from 
the isolationism of the 1910 revolution to the free-trade model endorsed by the World 
Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other 
neoliberal organizations.  As a result, jobs were created in urban areas and the already 
massive class disparity in Mexico only grew.44  The Salinas administration threw 
additional gasoline upon the flames of peasant discontent when it destroyed land reform.  
NAFTA came as a final blow, as it proposed a complete destruction of indigenous 
agricultural markets, land distribution and social structure.  When the Zapatistas rebelled 
on the day of NAFTA’s implementation they sent a message to the world that global 
capitalism was hurting the world’s poor.  Furthermore, they rejected capital’s domination 
of the people around the globe.  “…we can build [the world] as we want it and not as 
Power wants it to be.  We have made the Power of Money tremble … and dignity is 
beginning to unite.  The Power of Money is afraid because the uniting of dignities 
signifies its downfall.”45  But the Zapatistas critique of neoliberalism was more than just 
a reaction to the loss of land reform; it was also a refusal to be assimilated into the 
capitalist world economy. 
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The Zapatistas understood the coming impacts of neoliberalism.  Many of their 
leaders, being educated in socialist theory, understood the threat of capitalist expansion 
and quickly educated the local population.  They foresaw not only the loss of their land, 
but the loss of what little local autonomy they still retained.  They feared loosing the 
ability to produce for themselves and the control of their natural recourses.  Although 
opening Chiapas to foreign markets would surely bring jobs to the region, it would 
accelerate the transformation of labor to low-paying, brutal ‘sweatshop’ manufacturing, 
industrial agriculture and natural resource extraction.  Furthermore, these invading 
industries would fail to employ the entire population, leaving many Chiapans both jobless 
and landless.  According to World Bank demands, neoliberal restructuring would 
eliminate many social services that might have protected some of the peasant population.  
The Zapatistas therefore joined in the anti-capitalist struggle.  They did not, however, 
take the Marxist approach of controlling the means of production.  Rather, they rejected 
the industrial capitalist model altogether.  In this sense, the rebellion was not a workers 
revolt, but a revolt of those who refuse to be workers within the modern neoliberal world 
market.   
A 1996 international meeting of anti-globalization activists hosted by the EZLN 
in Chiapas sums up the sentiments of the Zapatistas in its title: “For Humanity Against 
Neoliberalism.”46  Gustavo Esteva has even called the Zapatistas the “antithesis of 
neoliberalism.”47  In fact, the rebellion has become a symbol for anti-globalization 
activists across the globe, romanticized and idealized by the movement’s rhetoric.  The 
Zapatistas strategically responded to neoliberal expansion by demanding what they call 
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the “globalization of freedom.”48
Recognizing the increasingly powerful marriage of business and the state, the 
Zapatistas have chosen to attack both.  As national borders dissolve into transnational 
marketplaces and the international business community increasingly controls national 
governments, localized resistance to state domination falls short of addressing the global 
network of power.  The “Power of Money” to which the Zapatistas refer is the hegemonic 
force that has come from the marriage of capital interest and many state governments.  In 
this sense, their rebellion against this conglomerate of power (international capital and 
national government) is, in neo-Gramscian terms, a truly counter-hegemonic revolt.
  Their resistance, of course, is against all domination, 
and in order to achieve freedom they have chosen to resist power in all of its forms.   
49  
Neoliberalism has broadened the scope of contemporary rebellion by combining 
international state and economic powers.  Since the state relies on capital, and visa versa, 
a revolt against power must be directed at both.  Consequently, alongside their resistance 
to the domination of the Mexican government, the EZLN has rejected what they see as 
American Colonialism.  One prominent EZLN rallying cry makes this clear: “No 
queremos, y no nos da la gana, Ser una colonia, norteamericana (we don’t want, and it 
doesn’t do us any good, to be a North American colony.)”50
Indeed, it is impossible to understand the insurrection of the EZLN without 
addressing its rejection of neo-liberal economics and the globalization of capitalism.  It is 
equally impossible to address the anti-globalization movement without mentioning the 
monumental importance of the EZLN.  But the Zapatistas comprise a complex social 
movement and revolutionary force that are not easily labeled.  Although they are 
certainly anti-neoliberal, the title is quite inadequate in characterizing the movement as a 
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whole.  It makes no mention of their great diversity in social goals, and it fails to address 
the long history of peasant organizing from which it grew.  Like those paradigms already 
discussed, this one, too, falls short of providing a fitting box in which to place this 
awkward movement.  There is one paradigm, however, that boasts the ability to 
categorize the Zapatistas: postmodernism. 
 
Raging Against the Politics of Modernity: 
The Postmodern Perspective 
 
Postmodernists have argued in favor of what has become the most popular, and 
certainly most controversial, paradigm in relation to the EZLN.  The postmodern 
paradigm was borne of the post-Cold War era.  As the Soviet bloc crumbled, so too did 
the hopes of many leftist intellectuals.  The final blow to Bolshevik Communism had 
crushed many intellectuals’ hopes of creating a classless society.  Despair turned to 
disillusionment and finally to cynicism.  Accordingly, if the Marxist meta-narrative had 
failed, they concluded, all other meta-narratives must ultimately fail as well.  A sort of 
theoretical relativism began to sweep over the disillusioned left, claiming that all grand 
theories were merely the products of cultural bias and therefore void of validity.  From 
this relativism, the postmodern perspective was born.  The danger of this theory, (which, 
ironically, has constructed its own meta-narrative) is that it denies the legitimacy of all 
liberation-based struggles.  Class struggle, racial equality, indigenous rights and anti-
Capitalist movements, according to the postmodern critique, are no more than culturally 
biased and theoretically impotent relatives.  It was within this theoretical context that the 
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Zapatistas rebelled, rejecting the old models of ‘modern’ rebellion as well as postmodern 
relativism. 
Many postmodern scholars have pointed to the Zapatistas unprecedented media 
campaign as proof of their postmodernity.  It is true that ‘techno-rebellion’ has played a 
major role in the EZLN’s success and that it is an interesting break from past 
revolutionary practices.  For example, solidarity activists, supporting the struggle of the 
EZLN and opposing the economic and military dominance of Mexican and American 
forces, used new software know as ‘floodnet’ to tie up the internet communication of the 
Mexican government, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, and the Pentagon.  On September 
28, 1998, 20,000 international activists loaded these web pages and shut them down for 
up to three hours.  In a global reaction revealing the success of the tactic, international 
media covered the event.51
Instead of the common claim that this proves their postmodernity, Stefan Wray 
argues that what he calls ‘electronic civil disobedience’ is simply the logical progression 
of a century of activist tradition.
  
52  In the past, activists have staged sit-ins and various 
other forms of civil disobedience in an effort to block economic and political transaction.  
But in current times, blocking doorways or interstates has lost its effectiveness.  “The 
streets” as many economists and activists have recognized, “have become the location of 
dead capital.”53  In the contemporary economic system, big business conducts major 
transactions in cyberspace rather than physical arenas.  Consequently, civil disobedience 
has changed with the times as it attempts to confront power where it is vulnerable.54  In 
this light, the Zapatistas’ techno-rebellion loses its postmodern mysticism, but it gains the 
historical context of applying modern technology to traditional civil resistance. 
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Not only does the postmodern emphasis on technology neglect the history of civil 
disobedience, it denies the movement’s connection to the past.  As we have seen, the 
rebellion in Chiapas was the product of a decade of organizing, and as the Zapatistas 
themselves put it in the first phrase of their declaration of war, “we are the product of five 
hundred years of struggle…”55  This hardly seems like the language of a postmodern 
movement.  In fact, the rhetoric of Zapatismo is quite modern.  Their call for “work, land, 
housing, food, health, education, independence, freedom, democracy, and peace” is 
deeply rooted in the struggles of modernity.  Certainly, it is true that the EZLN has 
rejected the modern dichotomy of Socialist-Capitalist war, but their rebellion is rooted in 
class struggle, ethnic autonomy, and the fight for true democracy and freedom.  All of 
these objectives are quite modern.  Furthermore, postmodern theoretical relativism has 
debunked the notions of freedom, democracy, and class struggle as culturally biased.  
How, then, could postmodernists claim the EZLN as their own?  The truth is that the 
Zapatistas have rejected the postmodern disillusionment and risen up in spite of it.  
Clearly, Adam David Morton’s assertion that the EZLN is a rebellion to “move beyond 
the politics of modernity” is exaggerated and misleading.56  In fact, the postmodern 
analysis distorts the image of the Zapatistas.  It denies the movement’s root in traditional 
struggle while artificially forcing it into the preconceived theoretical model of 
postmodern scholars.57
 
 
 
 
 
Rejecting Prefabricated Paradigms and the Search for Truth 
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The contemporary failure to understand the complexities of the Zapatistas stems 
from the scholarly community’s insistence on classifying the movement into 
preconceived paradigms.  This study has shown, however, that this movement resists 
classification as much as it resists domination.  By attempting to label the Zapatistas 
while ignoring their own demands, most scholars are fundamentally misunderstanding 
the goals of this rebellion.  It cannot be classified within preconceived boxes because it is 
like no revolt we have seen.  It rejects power, but in doing so, refuses to take power itself.  
The Zapatistas have redefined the revolutionary project and constructed a truly new 
model of resistance.  Of course, there is danger in this thinking.  From this perspective it 
is easy to be lured into the postmodern analysis.  ‘They are new, so they must be 
postmodern.’  Many scholars have fallen into this trap, for as their research and 
arguments reject the postmodernity of the Zapatistas, they nevertheless use postmodern 
language.  “Intellectual fashion,” as Daniel Nugent puts it, is a powerful and influential 
dope.   
When scholars reject preconceived paradigms and simply try to analyze the 
Zapatistas for who and what they are, not what outside analysts would like them to be, it 
becomes clear that no paradigm yet conceived can encompass the many sides of the 
EZLN.  This, however, does not reject ability of paradigms to aid in the attempt to 
understand this movement.  In fact, without these paradigms scholars would be quite lost 
in our search for truth.  They provide a variety of perspectives, each at least partially 
valid, and they give a foundation upon which theorist can begin to structure their 
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analysis.  But a foundation is hardly all that scholars need to erect actual theoretical 
understanding.   
What further complicates analysis of the Zapatistas is that their democratic nature 
allows the movement’s ideological and tactical framework to shift and flow with the 
beliefs of civil society.  What might appear as an indigenous rights issue could quickly 
change to an anti-neoliberal issue, and the first analysis is thrown for a loop.  This 
dynamic, however, is a strength of the rebellion.  Through its flexibility it is able to 
customize its resistance to the constantly evolving enemy.  Therefore, when the state tries 
to smother it with military might, the EZLN’s democratic decentralization of power 
makes such an attempt very difficult.  Armed force can easily defeat a weak military unit 
such as the EZLN, but it is much more difficult to crush an entire social base.  The 
Zapatistas are not simply an army representing a political group, they are a community in 
arms.  Therefore the EZLN can only be defeated through genocide or an ideological shift 
within the movement itself.  And the latter would not be defeat, for it would be the 
democratic demand of the community.  Scholars must understand these innovations if 
they are ever to conceptualize the EZLN.   
As revolutionaries fighting for true democracy, indigenous rights and global 
economic justice, the Zapatistas have called for global revolution.  They do not fight for 
control of the state, or any imperialist expansion, rather they have proposed a new global 
social model.  The breadth of their goals is difficult to conceptualize because they are so 
vast and so fluid.  The revolution for which they fight is the extension of all liberation-
based activism.  The Mexican public’s reaction, “We are all Zapatistas” and “We are all 
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Marcos,” epitomizes this unique nature of the EZLN.  In one communiqué, the Zapatistas 
wrote: 
Marcos is gay in San Francisco, a black in South Africa, Asian in Europe, a 
Chicano in San Isidro, and anarchist is Spain, a Palestinian in Israel, an 
indigenous person in the streets of San Cristóbal, a gang member in Neza, a 
rocker on campus, a Jew in Germany, an ombudsman in the Department of 
Defense, a feminist in a political party, a communist in the post-Cold War period, 
a prisoner in Cintalapa, a pacifist in Bosnia, a Mapuche in the Andes, a teacher in 
the National Confederation of Educational Workers, and artist without a gallery or 
a portfolio, a housewife in any neighborhood in any city in any part of Mexico on 
a Saturday night, a guerrilla in Mexico at the end of the twentieth century, a 
striker in the CTM, a sexist in the feminist movement, a woman alone in a Metro 
station at 10 p.m., a retired person standing around in the Zocalo, a peasant 
without land, and underground editor, and unemployed worker, a doctor with no 
office, a non-conformist student, a dissident against neoliberalism, a writer 
without books or readers, and a Zapatista in the Mexican southeast.  In other 
words, Marcos is a human being in the world.  Marcos is every untolerated, 
oppressed, exploited minority that is resisting and saying ‘Enough!’58
 
 
This is why the Zapatistas are so difficult to conceptualize.  They represent a global 
movement that does not yet fully exist, and which is embedded with contradiction.  They 
demand abstract concepts such as dignity, “…we saw, brothers, that all that we had was 
DIGNITY, and we saw that great was the shame of having forgotten it, and we saw that 
DIGNITY was good for men to be men again, and dignity returned to live in our hearts, 
and we were new again, and the dead, our dead, saw that we were new again and they 
called us again, to dignity, to struggle.”59
Such ambiguity makes the movement difficult to define, but it simultaneously gives 
it the strength of flexibility.  Perhaps this is why it is so tempting to romanticize the 
Zapatistas, for they allow the outsider to insert his or her own ideals into their movement.  
They symbolize the struggle of all movements for liberation, and encourage others to take 
hope from their uprising.  But those outsiders must not impose their ideals onto the 
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Zapatistas, co-opting the movement as their own.  For if they hope to understand, they 
must be willing to accept complexity and embrace the breadth of the movement. 
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